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1. Introduction
Franz	Brentano’s	Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt	 has	 inspired	
the	 development	 of	 first-order	 or	 self-representational	 theories	 of	
consciousness.1	Such	 theories	hold	 that	a	mental	event	or	process	 is	
conscious	 if,	 and	only	 if,	 it	 represents	 itself	 among	other	 things.	 For	
example,	Caston	(2004,	524)	writes:	“A	perception	is	directed	at	itself	as	
well	as	at	a	perceptible	quality	in	the	world.”2	In	contrast,	higher-order	
theories	of	consciousness	argue	that	a	mental	event	or	state	is	conscious	
if,	and	only	if,	there	is	a	distinct	mental	representation	of	it	—	a	thought	
or	a	perception	—	that	is	non-inferentially	arrived	at.	According	to	both	
views,	 consciousness	 of	 a	 mental	 phenomenon	 consists	 in,	 broadly	
speaking,	a	representation	of	it.	But	only	the	self-representational	view	
has	it	that	it	is	intrinsic	to	a	mental	phenomenon	that	it	is	represented.	
The	 higher-order	 view	 denies	 this:	 a	 mental	 phenomenon	 may	 be	
represented	by	a	distinct	mental	state/event	or	not.	
In	this	paper	I	will	not	argue	for	the	self-representational	view,	but	
rather	explore	whether	it	can	be	defended	against	an	important	objection	
by	developing	Brentano’s	notion	of	consciousness	“on	the	side”.	
Let	 us	 start	 by	 outlining	 the	 objection	 that	 calls	 for	 a	 response	
from	 the	 proponent	 of	 the	 self-representational	 view.	 The	 self-
representational	view	is	often	motivated	by	saying	that	it	captures	how	
things	are	for	us	when	we	consciously	perceive	and	think.	Goldman	
articulates	this	reason	as	follows:	
[C]onsider	 the	 case	of	 thinking	about	x	 or	 attending	 to	
x.	In	the	presence	of	thinking	about	x	there	is	already	an	
1.	 Smith	 (1986,	 150ff)	 takes	Brentano	 to	provide	 a	model	 for	 the	 structure	of	
consciousness.	See	also	his	2004,	86–9.	Janzen	2008,	chapt.	6;	Kriegel	2003a,	
b	and	c;	and	Hossack	2002	take	Brentano	as	a	starting	point	in	developing	
self-representational	accounts	of	 consciousness.	For	 critical	discussion,	 see	
Zahavi	2004.	Kriegel	2009	is	a	book-length	treatment	of	the	self-representa-
tional	approach	to	phenomenal	consciousness.	
2.	 Aristotle’s	De Anima	is	the	main	influence	on	Brentano’s	work	on	conscious-
ness.	 Kosman	 1975	 relates	Aristotle’s	 view	 to	Moore’s	 and	 Sartre’s.	 Caston	
(2002,	768ff)	develops	a	reading	of	Aristotle’s	view	of	consciousness	that	is	
inspired	by	 the	work	of	Brentano	and	his	 student	Hermann	Schell.	 For	an	
overview	of	work	on	Aristotle’s	view	on	consciousness,	see	Johansen	2005.
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The	Contrarian	objection	has	force	only	if	the	self-representational	
view	is	that	the	painting	and	one’s	perceiving	of	it	are	in the same sense 
objects	of	the	perceiving.	However,	Brentano	argued	that	this	is	not	the	
case.	He	(1874,	185	[102])	quotes	Aristotle’s	Metaphysics	with	approval:
It	seems	that	knowing,	perceiving,	believing	and	thinking	
are	always	of	 something	else,	but	of	 themselves	on	 the	
side	[en parergo].	(Metaphysics	12.9) 
When	we,	for	example,	hear	a	note,	we	are	aware	of	our	hearing	the	
note,	but	only	 “on	 the	 side”.	Talk	of	perceiving	one’s	mental	activity	
“on	 the	side”	 suggests	 that	 someone	who	 loses	himself,	 for	example,	
in	a	painting	 is	 still	 aware	of	his	perceiving,	but	 in	a	way	 that	does	
not	“register”	with	the	perceiver.	Brentano	ranks	therefore	the	objects	
of	 perception:	 the	 painting	 etc.	 is	 the	 primary,	 the	 perception	 the	
secondary	object.	
Brentano’s	distinction	between	primary	and	secondary	object	can	
solve	the	problem	just	outlined	only	if	he	provides	an	independently	
motivated	 answer	 why	 (a)	 one’s	 current	 mental	 act	 can	 only	 be	
the	 secondary	 object	 of	 this	mental	 act	 and	 (b)	why	 the	 secondary	
object	is	not	noticed	by	the	thinker.	The	thrust	of	Brentano’s	answer	
is	 conveyed	 by	 the	 slogan	 ‘Inner	 perception	 (awareness)	 can	 never	
become	 observation’.6	 Ryle’s	 Concept of Mind	 contains	 echoes	 of	
Brentano’s	slogan.7	Ryle	distinguishes	in	perceptions	a	non-intentional	
constituent,	sensation,	and	argues	on	the	basis	of	grammatical	points	
a	 higher-order	 thought,	 and	 that	 thought	 is	 usually	 not	 itself	 a	 conscious	
thought”.	However,	 according	 to	 (one	 understanding	 of)	 the	 transparency	
thesis,	we	don’t	focus	on	the	sensory	state,	but	its	object,	the	colour,	sound	
etc.	 Hence,	 the	 transparency	 phenomenon	 also	 poses	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	
higher-order	view.	How	can	the	sensory	state	be	the	object	of	a	higher-order	
presentation	and	yet	escape	one’s	notice?
6.	 See	Brentano	1874,	41	 [22],	61	 [32],	 180	[99]	and	Brentano	1911,	 130.	Refer-
ences	are	to	the	reprint	of	the	1924	edition	of	Psychologie,	with	references	to	
the	pagination	of	the	English	translation	in	square	brackets.
7.	 Ryle	knew	Brentano’s	work	very	well.	See,	for	example,	Ryle	1928.
implicit	awareness	that	one	is	thinking	about	x.	There	is	
no	need	for	reflection	here,	for	taking	a	step	back	from	x	
in	order	to	examine	it.	(I	borrow	this	quote	from	Kriegel	
2009,	176.)	
Agnostics	 respond	 that	 such	phenomenological	 considerations	 speak	
neither	in	favor	of	nor	against	self-representationalism.3	What	the	right	
view	of	consciousness	is	needs	to	be	settled	differently.	In	Psychologie 
(1874,	176–9	[97–8]),	Brentano	proposes	an	argument	for	his	version	of	
the	self-representational	view	of	consciousness	that	does	not	rely	on	a	
claim	about	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	thought	and	perception.	
I	will	therefore	set	Agnosticism	aside.	
Contrarians,	 in	 turn,	 argue	 that	 it	 seems	 to	us	 that	our	 conscious	
perceiving	 and	 thinking	 is	 not	 directed	 upon	 itself.4	 For	 instance,	
Gennaro	reports:	
It	does	not	seem	to	me	that	I	am	consciously	aware	(in	any	
sense)	of	my	own	experience	when	I	am,	say,	consciously	
attending	 to	 a	 play	 or	 the	 task	 of	 building	 a	 bookcase.	
(Gennaro	2008,	49)
It	often	seems	to	be	the	case	that	(i)	one	is	absorbed	in	a	perceptual	
activity	 such	 as	 perceiving	 a	 painting,	 (ii)	 one	 is	 still	 consciously	
perceiving	 the	 painting,	 but	 (iii)	 since	 one	 is	 absorbed	 in	 one’s	
perception,	 there	 is	 no	 noticing	 of	 one’s	 perceptual	 activity.	 If	 one	
agrees	with	(i)–(iii),	the	self-representational	theory	of	consciousness	
seems	to	be	in	trouble.	How	can	(i)–(iii)	be	true,	yet	consciousness	of	
perceiving	be	intrinsic	to	perceiving?5
3.	 Brentano’s	contemporary	Wilhelm	Dilthey	(1880–90,	290)	takes	this	agnostic	
stance	towards	Brentano’s	thesis.	See	also	Mehta	2013.
4.	 See	also	Cook	Wilson	1926,	79.	
5.	 Rosenthal	 (1986,	 345)	 takes	 this	 so-called	 “transparency”	 of	 consciousness	
not	only	to	speak	against	the	self-representational,	but	also	to	speak	for	the	
higher-order	view:	“We	normally	focus	on	the	sensory	state	and	not	on	our	
consciousness	of	 it	only	because	that	consciousness	consists	 in	our	having	
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The	tone	F	is	the	primary	object,	the	hearing	of	the	tone	the	secondary	
object	of	my	hearing.	What	is	the	basis	for	this	distinction?	
Brentano’s	first-stab	answer	is	that in	hearing	a	tone,	one	is	“turned	
to	 it	 in	 the	most	 proper	 sense”;	 one	 is	 not	 turned	 to	 one’s	 hearing	
of	 the	 tone.	 Now	 what	 does	 ‘turned	 to	 in	 the	 most	 proper	 sense’	
mean?	 In	order	 to	answer	 this	question,	we	need	 to	get	clear	about	
what	Brentano	means	by	‘zu gewandt’.	 ‘x ist y zu gewendet’	has	several	
meanings	in	German.	One	of	them	is	that	x	is	in	some	sense	oriented	
in	the	direction	of	y.	(‘Ihr Gesicht war ihm zu gewendet’	is	translated	as	
‘Her	face	was	turned	to	him’.)	This	meaning	is	picked	up	in	the	English	
translation.	But	‘zu wenden’	also	refers,	roughly	speaking,	to	taking	an	
interest	in	or	directing	one’s	attention	to	something.	And	this	seems	
to	be	 the	meaning	Brentano	 intends	 ‘turn	 to’	 to	have.	 It	 is	 therefore	
natural	to	take	Brentano	to	hold	that	among	the	objects	of	a	mental	act,	
one	is	privileged	because	it	is	the	object	one	pays	attention	to	in	the	
act:	Something	x	is	the	primary	object	of	a	mental	act	by	a	thinker	T	if,	
and	only	if,	T’s attention	is	directed	on	x	in	this	act.	
This	first-stab	characterization	of	the	distinction	between	primary	
and	secondary	object	seems	plausible	enough.	 If	we	simultaneously	
perceive	A	 and	B,	 but	 only	A	 engages	 our	 attention,	B	 escapes	 our	
notice.	 Take	 reading	 a	 sentence	 with	 understanding	 as	 a	 model.	
Reading	a	sentence	with	understanding	has	two	sides:	 it	consists	of	
the	 apprehension	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 the	words	 expressed	 and	 of	 a	
perceiving	 of	 the	 sentence	 inscription,	 the	 physical	 object.	 Reading	
with	understanding	has	 two	objects:	 the	meaning	and	 the	 sentence	
inscription.9	These	objects	are	not	created	equal.	If	you	read	the	English	
sentence	 ‘This	product	contains	traces	of	nuts’,	you	are	immersed	in	
the	meaning	of	the	written	words,	while	the	words	themselves	tend	to	
escape	you,	although	they	are	perceived.
Current	 proponents	 of	 the	 self-representational	 view	 of	
consciousness	have	taken	a	clue	from	such	observations	and	proposed	
to	spell	out	the	difference	between	what	Brentano	calls	“primary”	and	
9.	 See	Husserl	1913,	419,	and	Byrne	2001,	212.
that	one	cannot	observe	a	 sensation.	 If	one	says	 that	one	observes	a	
glimpse,	one	commits	a	category	mistake.8
In	this	paper	I	will	expound	the	view	that	is	expressed	in	Brentano’s	
slogan	 and	 assess	 his	 arguments	 for	 holding	 it.	 This	 project	 is	 of	
independent	philosophical	interest	because	Brentano’s	view	promises	
to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 distinctive	 character	 of	 awareness.	 I	will	 argue	
that	the	arguments	Brentano	provides	in	Psychologie	are	unconvincing	
(see	sections	4	and	5).	Nonetheless	one	can	extract	 from	Brentano’s	
writings	 on	 descriptive	 psychology	 a	 promising	 argument	 for	 the	
rational	 core	 of	 the	 slogan	 (see	 sections	 6–10).	 This	 argument	 is	
based	on	an	assumption	about	the	unity	of	consciousness.	The	object	
of	our	awareness	 is	a	whole	of	simultaneous	activities.	Attending	to	
one	of	them	in	particular	(observing	it)	requires	seeking	out	contrasts	
between	 mental	 activities.	 Awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation,	
because	mere	awareness	of	a	mental	phenomenon	cannot	contrast	it	
with	others.
2. Brentano on primary and secondary object 
According	to	Brentano,	every	mental	act	such	as	hearing	a	note,	smelling	
a	smell,	seeing	a	colour	etc.	 is	directed	on	itself	on	the	side.	For	the	
purposes	 of	 this	 paper,	 I	 will	 assume	 the	 weaker	 thesis	 that	 some	
mental	acts,	the	ones	that	are	conscious,	are	directed	on	themselves	
on	the	side.	For	instance,	when	I	consciously	hear	a	note,	I	perceive	
my	hearing	it	on	the	side.	I	hear	the	note	—	say,	F —	and	perceive	my	
hearing,	but	these	objects	are	not	“created	equal”:
We	can	say	that	the	tone	is	the	primary object	of	the	act	of	
hearing	and	that	the	act	of	hearing	itself	is	the	secondary 
object.	 […]	The	act	of	hearing	 the	 tone	 is	 turned	 to	 the	
tone	 in	 the	 most	 proper	 sense	 [im eigentlichsten Sinne 
zugewandt],	and	in	being	so	turned	it	seems	to	grasp	itself	
on	 the	 side	 [nebenbei]	 and	 as	 an	 added	 extra	 [Zugabe].	
(1874,	180	[98],	in	part	my	translation.)
8.	 See,	for	example,	Ryle	1949,	197.
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on	the	object	of	inner	perception.	[…]	It	is	only	while	our	
attention	is	turned	toward	a	different	object	that	we	are	
able	to	perceive,	incidentally,	the	mental	processes	which	
are	 directed	 toward	 that	 object.	 Thus	 the	 observation	
of	 physical	 phenomena	 in	 external	 perception,	 while	
offering	 us	 a	 basis	 for	 knowledge	 of	 nature,	 can	 at	 the	
same	 time	 become	 a	means	 of	 attaining	 knowledge	 of	
the	 mind.	 Indeed,	 turning	 one’s	 attention	 to	 physical	
phenomena	in	our	imagination	is,	if	not	the	only	source	
of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 laws	 governing	 the	mind,	 at	 least	
the	immediate	and	principal	source.	(Brentano	1874,	41–2	
[22].	In	part	my	translation,	my	emphasis.)
Inner	 perception	 or	 awareness,	 says	 Brentano,	 neither	 is	 nor	 can	
become	observation.	I	will	call	this	claim	the	Awareness ≠ Observation 
Thesis,	in	short	the	A ≠ O Thesis.	In	contrast,	outer	perception	(seeing,	
hearing,	smelling)	can	become	observation.	For	example,	my	hearing	
the	song	of	the	birds	can	become	listening	to	the	birdsong,	that	is,	an	
observing	 of	 the	 song.	 In	 general,	 perceptual	 activities	 like	 hearing,	
seeing	and	touching	can	become	observations	(listenings,	watchings	
etc.).	For	instance,	when	you	read	the	sentence	‘This	product	contains	
traces	of	nuts’	with	understanding,	you	may	merely	see	the	inscription,	
but	this	seeing	can	become	observing	if	you	turn	your	attention	to	the	
inscription.	The	A ≠ O Thesis	grounds	Brentano’s	distinction	between	
primary	and	secondary	object.	 If	Brentano	 is	 right,	a	mental	act	can	
neither	 be	 nor	 become	 its	 own	 primary	 object;	 it	 can	 only	 be	 its	
secondary	object,	that	is,	we	are	aware	of	it,	but	we	cannot	observe	it.	
The	A ≠ O Thesis	does	not	exclude	that	mental	phenomena	can	be	
observed.	It	only	implies	that	any	observation	of	a	mental	phenomenon	
is	not	(only)	awareness	of	it.	For	example,	remembering	one’s	hearing	
F	is	not	awareness	of	it.	Prima facie,	one	can	pay	attention	to	hearing	F 
when	one	remembers	it.	But	Brentano	carefully	avoids	calling	paying	
attention	 to	 a	 mental	 phenomenon	 in	 memory	 “observation”.	 For	
example,	he	writes:
“secondary	object”	by	means	of	 the	notion	of	attention.	For	example,	
Kriegel	(2003a,	17)	proposes	that	that	we	dedicate	only	little	attention	
to	our	current	perceiving.	In	seeing	a	scene,	one	is	peripherally	aware	
of	some	parts	of	the	scene	and	of	seeing	the	scene.10	Caston	agrees:	“In	
ordinary	experience,	we	glimpse	our	perceiving	only	peripherally,	as	
it	were”	(Caston	2002,	787).
3. Primary object and observation
However,	the	primary	object	of	a	mental	act	cannot	simply	be	the	ob-
ject	that	 is	attended	to	in	this	act.	To	see	this,	consider	again	the	ex-
ample	of	reading	a	sentence	of	a	language	one	masters.	Usually,	we	are	
interested	 in	the	meaning	of	a	written	sentence.	But	 this	 is	a	contin-
gent	fact.	If	I	have	a	standing	interest	in	fonts	or	handwritings,	I	will	at-
tend	to	the	inscribed	words	and	not	to	their	meaning.	Similarly,	I	may	
have	a	standing	interest	in	my	perceiving.	For	example,	a	descriptive	
psychologist	will	be	interested	in	his	mental	life.	One	should	therefore	
expect	 that	 one	 sometimes	 focuses	 one’s	 attention	 on	 the perceiving 
and	not	what is perceived.	Hence,	for	instance,	hearing	F	could	be	the	
primary	and	F	the	secondary	object	of	hearing	F.	In	contrast,	Brentano	
holds	that	our	perceiving	can	only	be	the	secondary	object;	when	we	
perceive,	we	cannot	turn	our	attention	to	the	perceiving	itself:
It is a peculiar feature of inner perception [die innere 
Wahrnehmung hat das Eigentümliche] that it can never 
become inner observation.	Objects	which	one,	as	one	puts	it,	
perceives	outwardly	can	be	observed;	one	focuses	one’s	
attention	 completely	 on	 them	 in	 order	 to	 apprehend	
them	precisely	[genau].	But with objects of inner perception 
this is absolutely impossible.	 […]	 It	 is	 a	 universally	 valid	
psychological	law	that	we	can	never	focus	our	attention	
10.	 See	also	Kriegel	2005,	26.	Janzen	(2008,	106–8)	proposes	that	one	is	only	
implicitly	aware	of	one’s	perception	when	one	perceives.	But	he	character-
ises	implicit	awareness	by	referring	to	Brentano’s	view	that	seeing	etc.	is	of	
itself	“on	the	side”	and	thereby	takes	us	directly	back	to	the	problem	inves-
tigated	here.
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does	not	say	much	about	the	purpose.	In	his	lectures	on	descriptive	
psychology,	he	says	more:
We	 say	 that	 one	 pays	 attention	 [aufmerken]	 where	 we	
desire	 to	 notice	 [bemerken]	 something	 that	 happens	
or	 will	 happen	 in	 us	 and	 arguably	 also	 to	 memorize	
it	 [merken]	 and	 where	 this	 desire	 drives	 us	 to	 create	
favourable	 dispositions	 for	 this;	 one	 can	 therefore	 say	
that	we	aspire	to	notice.	(Brentano	1890/1,	35	[38],	in	part	
my	translation.)
Brentano	 is	 concerned	 here	with	 directing	 one’s	 attention	 on	 one’s	
mental	 acts,	 but	 part	 of	 his	 explanation	 applies	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
directing	one’s	attention	to	an	object	or	event	in	general:
T	directs	his	attention	towards	x	if,	and	only	if,	(i)	T	desires	
to	come	to	know	properties	of	x	and	to	commit	them	to	
memory	&	(ii)	the	desire	mentioned	in	(i)	motivates	T	to	
bring	about	favorable	conditions	for	its	satisfaction.
Consider	an	example	for	illustration.	I	walk	through	the	park	while	the	
birds	are	singing.	My	hearing	is	working	normally,	and	I	hear,	among	
other	things,	the	song	of	the	birds.	Then	a	particularly	beautiful	song	
captures	my	interest,	and	I	desire	to	hear	more	of	it	and	to	distinguish	
it	 from	 the	 other	 sounds.	 This	 desire	 drives	me	 to	 create	 favorable	
conditions	for	its	satisfaction.	We	mark	the	transition	from	hearing	the	
song	to	hearing	out	of	the	desire	to	hear	more	of	the	song	or	hear	it	
better	by	saying	that	I	start	 listening to	and	 listening out for	 it.	When	I	
start	 to	 listen	to	the	birdsong,	 the	perceptual	activity	and	the	ability	
exercised	are	still	the	same:	I	am	hearing	the	song	of	the	bird.	But	I	am	
hearing	it	now	out	of	the	desire	to	learn	more	about	it.
As	 a	 general	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 turn	 one’s	 attention	 to	 an	
object,	 Brentano’s	 proposal	 is	 too	 narrow.	 Bradley	 (1902,	 4)	 gives	
the	 examples	 of	 attentively	 listening	 to	 an	 air	 and	 paying	 attention	
to	 the	 development	 of	 pain	 or	 pleasure.	My	 listening	 attentively	 to	
[W]hen	we	view	[betrachten]	a	previous	act	of	hearing	in	
memory,	we	turn	toward	it	as	a	primary	object,	and	thus	
we	sometimes	turn	toward	it	in	a	way	that	is	similar to	an	
observer	 [in ähnlicher Weise wie ein Beobachtender].	 (1874,	
181	[99].	My	translation.)
Why	only	 “similar	 to	 an	observer”	 and	not	 simply	 “as	 an	observer”?	
Brentano	argues	that	memory	can	deceive	us.	But	the	same	is	true	of	
the	observation	of	objects	 in	 current	perception.	Wundt	 (1888,	294)	
helps	Brentano	out	by	proposing	that	something	can	be	observed	at	a	
time	only	if	it	exists	at	that	time.	A	flash	of	lightning	can	be	perceived	
but	not	observed,	because	it	does	not	exist	long	enough	to	be	observed.	
But	one	can	observe	a	dying	sun,	although	it	no	longer	exists	at	the	
time	of	one’s	observation.11	There	is,	then,	no	direct	way	to	argue	from	
the	 assumption	 that	 awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation	 to	 the	
conclusion	that	mental	acts	cannot	be	observed	at	all.	
In	order	to	assess	Brentano’s	A ≠ O Thesis,	we	need	to	know	more	
about	observation.	Observing	an	object	or	event	a	 is	 focusing	one’s	
attention	on	a	in	order	(intending)	to	perceive	it	precisely	(Brentano	
1874,	41	[22]).	Because	observing	an	object	requires	one	to	turn	one’s	
attention	to	it,	it	is	the	primary	object	(Brentano	1874,	181	[99]).	
Not	all	objects	one	attends	to	are	objects	one has turned one’s attention 
to.	 (See	Brentano	 1890/1,	 36	 [38–9].)12	An	object	may	 capture	one’s	
attention	against one’s will.	If	an	acrobat	performs	breathtaking	stunts	
during	 a	 biology	 lecture,	 she	 will	 capture	 the	 audience’s	 attention,	
although	they	ought	to	and	want	to	focus	their	attention	on	the	plant	
they	are	studying.	
This	 example	 gives	 us	 a	 first	 pointer	 as	 to	 what	 focusing	 one’s	
attention	amounts	to.	One	turns	one’s	attention	to	something	if	one	
wants	 to	 perceive	 it	 for	 a	 certain	 purpose.	 In	 Psychologie,	 Brentano	
11.	 Thanks	to	Johannes	Brandl	for	this	counter-example.	
12.	 See	Windischer	1935,	407	for	a	good	overview	of	conceptions	of	observation	
of	authors	influenced	by	Brentano.
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4. Brentano’s intuitive consideration 
When	expounding	the	A ≠ O Thesis,	Brentano	gives	an	example	that	
will	resonate	with	many	of	his	readers:
[The	 fact	 that	 awareness	 neither	 is	 nor	 can	 become	
observation]	 is	 especially	 clear	 with	 respect	 to	 certain	
mental	phenomena	such	as	anger	[Zorn].	For	if	someone	
wants	 to	 observe	 the	 anger	 which	 rages	 in	 him,	 the	
anger	would	already	have	 cooled	off,	 and	 the	object	of	
observation	would	have	vanished.	The	same	impossibility	
obtains	in	other	cases.	We	will	have	to	discuss	this	issue	
in	more	detail	later	on.	For	the	moment	it	will	suffice	to	
call	attention	to	the	personal	experience	of	an	unbiased	
person.	(Brentano	1874,	41	[22])14
The	example	is	supposed	to	make	the	A ≠ O Thesis	initially	plausible;	
it	 is	not	 intended	 to	provide	 the	 true	 reason	 for	 the	 thesis.	Such	an	
explanatory	argument	will	be	possible	only	after	Brentano	has	argued	
that	 consciousness	 of	 a	mental	 act	—	 say,	 consciousness	 of	 hearing	
F —	and	hearing	F	are	not	two	distinct	mental	acts.	I	will	elaborate	this	
point	in	the	next	section.	
How	 does	 this	 intuitive	 consideration	 work?	 Imagine	 that	 you	
have	a	fit	of	road	rage.	If	you	are	raging	with	anger,	you	are	aware	of	
your	anger,	but	you	cannot	observe	it.	Why?	When	I	am	raging	with	
anger,	 I	 “cannot	 think	of	 anything	else”	but	 the	object	 to	which	my	
anger	 is	 directed,	 say,	 the	 careless	 driver.	 In	 this	 situation,	 I	 cannot	
form	the	desire	or	the	intention	required	to	turn	my	awareness	of	my	
14.	 I	 have	 re-translated	 the	 passage.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 Brentano’s	 translators	
render	 the	 crucial	 sentence	 ‘Denn wer den Zorn, der in ihm glüht, beobachten 
wollte, bei dem wäre er offenbar bereits gekühlt, und der Gegenstand der Beobachtung 
verschwunden’	by	introducing	a	scale	of	intensity	of	anger:	‘If	someone	is	in	
a	state	in	which	he	wants	to	observe	his	own	anger	raging	within	him,	the	
anger	must	already	be somewhat diminished,	and	so	his	original	object	of	ob-
servation	would	have	disappeared.’	According	to	Brentano,	the	anger	is	not	
somewhat	diminished,	but	simply	cooled	off.	There	is	no	gradation	here.
Bach’s	air	may	consist	 simply	 in	hearing	 it	out	of	 the	desire	 to	 fully	
appreciate	it	or	simply	to	continue	hearing	it.	Bradley	(ibid.)	responds	
to	this	observation	by	arguing	that	any	attentive	perception	aims	“to	
maintain	an	object	before	me	with	a	view	to	gain	knowledge	about	
it”,	 but	 that	 the	 knowledge	 is	 in	 a	 “wide	 sense”	 theoretical	 or	 ideal.	
However,	Bradley’s	“wide	sense”	only	names	the	problem	to	be	solved.	
Brentano’s	work	on	 aesthetic	 value	points	 one	 in	 the	direction	of	 a	
more	satisfying	answer:	One	can	merely	hear	an	air	or	listen	to	it	out	of	
the	desire	to	respond	adequately	to	its	aesthetic	value.	I	will,	however,	
not	 try	 to	 complete	 the	 account	 of	 attention	 under	 consideration	
here.	For	if	Brentano	has	a	good	reason	that	inner	perception	cannot	
become	observation,	 this	 reason	will	 also	 apply	 to	 the	 aesthetic,	 or	
more	generally,	value	case.13 
Why	accept	the	A ≠ O Thesis?	Brentano’s	reason	seems	to	be	that	
when	one,	for	example,	hears	a	song,	one	can’t	turn	one’s	attention	to	
one’s	hearing.	Again,	this	claim	is	 in	need	of	argumentative	support.	
After	unpacking	the	notion	of	turning	one’s	attention	to	an	object,	we	
can	distinguish	two	potential	reasons	for	the	A ≠ O Thesis:	
First,	 awareness	 neither	 is	 nor	 can	 become	observation	
because	one	can’t	desire	to	come	to	know	the	objects	one	
is	currently	aware	of	better.
Second,	awareness	neither	is	nor	can	become	observation	
because	 the	desire	 to	 know	 the	object	 of	 one’s	 current	
awareness	 can’t	be	 satisfied	by	 continuing	 to	be	aware	
of	it.	
In	the	next	section,	I	will	look	at	Brentano’s	attempt	to	spell	out	the	
first	potential	reason	and	find	it	wanting.
13.	 See	Crowther	2010	for	further	discussion.
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in	 introspection	 one	would	 perforce	 be	 presented	with	
a	milder,	unconsuming	variety	of	anger	experience.	Yet	
the	experience	one	actually	underwent	—	the	experience	
one	wished	to	examine	by	introspection	—	was	a	different,	
stronger	and	more	violent	anger	experience.	That original 
experience therefore eludes introspection — as soon as we 
turn our attention to it, it goes out of existence and is replaced 
by another, phenomenally different experience.	 (Kriegel	
forthcoming,	my	emphasis)17
In	Brentano’s	example,	the	person	raging	with	anger	could	not	desire	to	
learn	more	about	his	raging	anger.	In	contrast,	Kriegel	argues	that	the	
attempt	to	observe	one’s	raging	anger	will	make	the	anger	disappear.	
Reid	used	a	version	of	this	argument	to	make	the	thesis	plausible	that	
introspection	of	a	passion	cannot	become	observation:18
[W]hen	the	mind	is	agitated	by	any	passion,	as	soon	as	we	
turn	our	attention	from	the	object	to	the	passion	itself,	the	
passion	subsides	or	vanishes,	and	by	that	means	escapes	
our	 enquiry.	 This,	 indeed,	 is	 common	 to	 almost	 every	
operation	of	mind	[…].	(Reid	1785,	62,	my	emphasis.)
Brentano	 himself	 suggests	 this	 way	 of	 developing	 the	 anger	
consideration	in	a	section	that	follows	his	initial	discussion	of	anger.	
We	cannot	observer	our	anger	when	we	are	angry,	but	we	can	recall	
such	an	“earlier	state	of	excitement”:
If	the	attempt	to	observe	the	anger	which	stirs	us	becomes	
impossible	 because	 the	 phenomenon	 disappears,	 it	 is	
clear	that	an	earlier	state	of	excitement	can	no	longer	be	
interfered	with	in	this	way.	(Brentano	1874,	49	[26])
17.	 Thanks	 to	 Uriah	 Kriegel	 for	 allowing	me	 to	 quote	 from	 this	 unpublished	
paper.
18.	 See	Yaffe	2009,	172.
anger	into	an	observation	of	it.15	One	is	no	longer	raging	with	anger	if	
one	can	form	the	desire	to	learn	more	about	one’s	anger.	The	anger	is	
then	no	longer	all-consuming;	it	has	cooled	off.	In	contrast,	awareness 
of	 raging	 anger	 neither	 requires	 forming	 an	 intention	nor	 having	 a	
desire.	 Brentano’s	 consideration	 shows	 that	 sometimes	 awareness	
cannot	become	observation	because	one	can’t	desire	or	intend	to	learn	
more	about	the	object	of	one’s	awareness	(see	previous	section).	The	
existence	of	some	mental	phenomena	such	as	anger	is	incompatible	
with	 the	desire	constitutive	of	 their	observation.	Hence,	one	cannot	
observe	them	when	one	undergoes	them.16
Prima facie,	the	intuitive	consideration	is	plausible	only	for	mental	
states	 that	 consume	 one,	 that	 is,	 that	 prevent	 one	 from	 forming	
intentions	or	desires.	Hence,	it	leaves	open	the	possibility	to	observe	
non-consuming	mental	states.	In	this	case	the	fact	that	we	are	in	such	
a	mental	state	does	not	preclude	having	the	desire	to	learn	more	about	
it.	One	might	push	this	point	further.	For	example,	is	the	milder	anger	
not	 the	 same	 anger	 as	 the	 consuming	 one?	 Consider	 an	 analogy:	
There	 is	 a	mosquito	buzzing	 round	very	 (very)	 fast.	 Because	of	 the	
speed	of	its	movement,	I	cannot	focus	my	visual	attention	on	it.	But	
when	the	mosquito	comes	to	rest,	I	can	and	do	observe	it.	In	this	case	
I	 can	observe	 the	object	 that	was	previously	unobservable,	because	
it	 has	 lost	 a	 property,	moving	 around	 extremely	 quickly,	 that	made	
it	unobservable.	Why	can’t	 the	same	go	 for	anger	etc.?	 Just	as	 I	can	
observe	the	mosquito	when	it	is	at	rest,	I	can	observe	the	anger	when	
it	has	lost	some	of	its	intensity.	What	I	can’t	do	is	observe	the	mosquito	
when	it	is	buzzing	around	and	the	anger	when	it	is	consuming.
Kriegel	 (forthcoming)	 tries	 to	 close	 this	 loophole	 in	 Brentano’s	
argument:
If	one	has	the	presence	of	mind	to	attend	to	one’s	anger,	
to	 reflect	 on	 it,	 one	 is	 no	 longer	 consumed	by	 it.	 Thus	
15.	 See	Kriegel,	forthcoming,	16.	
16.	 In	this	point	my	reconstruction	of	the	argument	differs	from	Mulligan	2004,	
73–4.
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A	 similar	 question	 arises	 for	 Kriegel’s	 reconstruction	 of	 the	
argument.	He	 relies	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 every	mental	 act	 has	 a	
phenomenal	 intensity.	 In	Psychologie,	Brentano	 indeed	holds	 that	all	
mental	acts	have	an	 intensity	and	 tentatively	 identifies	 the	 intensity	
of	 a	 judgement	with	 a	 degree	 of	 confidence.	 (See	 1874,	 192	 [105].)	
Our	question	becomes	therefore:	Why should the degree of confidence of 
a judgement change if one also desires to learn more about this judgement?	It	
seems	to	me	that	I	can	judge	with	the	same	degree	of	confidence	that	
p	whether	I	have	this	desire	or	not.	
In	 The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong	 (1889,	 57–8),	
Brentano	 rejects	 this	 view	 of	 judgemental	 intensity.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	
whether	 (a)	Brentano	wants	 to	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 judgements	 and	
other	mental	acts	have	intensity,	or	(b)	he	merely	changes	his	mind	
about	what	this	intensity	consists	in.	But	in	the	Appendix	of	the	1911	
edition,	 he	 opts	 for	 (a).	 Prima facie,	 a	 presentation	 of	 the	 number	
3	has	no	 intensity.	 (See	 1911,	 139	 [223].)	To	conclude:	By	Brentano’s	
own	 lights,	 the	 premises	 of	 the	 argument	 under	 consideration	 are	
not	general	enough	to	sustain	the	conclusion	that	no	mental	act	can	
become	observation	of	itself.
5. The Argument from the Nature of Observation
Brentano	returns	to	the	A ≠ O Thesis	after	developing	an	argument	for	the	
view	that	consciousness	of	a	mental	activity	and	the	mental	activity	one	
is	conscious	of	are	not	distinct.	He	concludes	this	argument	as	follows:
The	presentation	of	the	tone	and	the	presentation	of	the	
presentation	of	the	tone	form	not	more	than	one	single	
mental	 phenomenon;	 it	 is	 only	 by	 considering	 it	 in	 its	
relation	to	two	different	objects,	one	of	which	is	a	physical	
phenomenon	 and	 the	 other	 a	 mental	 phenomenon,	
that	 we	 divide	 it	 conceptually	 into	 two	 presentations.	
(Brentano	1874,	179	[98].	In	part	my	translation.)
This	conclusion	is	supposed	to	be	the	key	to	the	A ≠ O Thesis:
Brentano	proposes	now,	in	line	with	Reid,	that	one	can	come	to	desire	
to	 learn	 more	 about	 one’s	 raging	 anger,	 but	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	
desire	“interferes”	with	the	object	of	the	intended	observation.	
But	 the	claim	that	 the	attempt	 to	observe	a	mental	phenomenon	
extinguishes	 it	 is	 plausible	 only	 for	 “almost	 every	 operation	 of	 the	
mind”	(Reid	1785,	62).	A	passion	is	changed	if	one	acquires	a	desire	to	
observe	it.	A	desire	is	itself	a	conative	mental	phenomenon	that	may	
interfere	 with	 or	 extinguish	 another	 conative	 mental	 phenomenon.	
But	the	A ≠ O Thesis	is	not	restricted	to	conative	mental	phenomena.	
Non-conative	mental	 phenomena	may	 “survive”	 a	 shift	 of	 attention.	
Brentano’s	student	Stumpf	makes	this	point	later	(Stumpf	calls	mental	
activities	functions):
[I]t	is	not	absolutely	excluded	to	observe	current	functions	
already	 while	 they	 take	 place.	 The	 different	 kinds	 of	
mental	 functions	behave	 in	this	respect	differently.	Not	
all	suffer	from	such	a	thorough	destruction	as	the	affects	
or	a	difficult	arithmetical	operation.	Intellectual	functions,	
which	 require	 less	 concentration	 on	 the	 matter,	 can,	
already	 while	 they	 take	 place,	 simultaneously	 become	
to	a	certain	extent	the	object	of	our	observing.	We	must	
then	simply	divide	our	attention.	Consequently	neither	
the	 function	nor	 the	observation	will	 be	perfect,	 but	 it	
will	not	be	completely	impossible	and	will	be	combined	
with	 the	 just-past	 part	 of	 the	 function	 to	 form	 one	
complete	 impression	 of	 the	 experience.	 (Stumpf	 1939,	
350.	My	translation.)
Why	should,	 for	 instance,	my	desire	to	learn	more	about	inferring	p	
from	p	&	q	 interrupt	or	 interfere	with	my	inferring?	Prima facie,	 this	
desire	and	my	 inference	 can	co-exist.	Please	note	 that	 the	 idea	 that	
one	 can	 divide	 one’s	 attention	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 Stumpf’s	
argument.	I	will	come	back	to	this	in	the	next	section.
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observation	of	one’s	own	observing	or	any	other	of	one’s	
own	mental	 acts	 is	 possible.	We	 can	observe	 the	 tones	
we	hear,	but	we	cannot	observe	our	hearing	of	the	tones,	
for	 the	 hearing	 is	 only	 co-apprehended	 [mit erfasst]	 in	
the	hearing	of	the	sounds.	(1874,	181–2,	[99].	In	part	my	
translation.)
A	 first-stab	 reconstruction	 of	 this	 Argument	 from	 the	 Nature	 of	
Observation	is	as	follows:
If	M	 is	an	act	of	observing	x	and	x	≠ M, M	 cannot	also	
observe	M.
Therefore	 an	 act	 M	 of	 observing	 something	 x	 cannot	
become	an	act	of	observing	M.
Let	us	fill	in	the	missing	steps	of	the	argument:
(OB1)	If	M	is	an	act	of	observing	x,	x	is	the	primary	object	
of	M.	(Df.)
Therefore:	An	act	of	observing	a,	M
1
, has	a	as	its	primary	
object.
(OB2)	Every	act	has	only	one	primary	object.
Therefore:	Any	act	of	observing	M
1
	has	a	different	primary	
object	from	M
1
.	
(OB3)	If	x	is	the	primary	object	of	M	&	y	is	the	primary	
object	of	N	&	x	≠	y,	then	M ≠ N.
Therefore:	 Any	 act	 of	 observing	 M
1
	 that	 has	 M
1
	 as	 a	
primary	object	is	distinct	from	M
1
.	
Do	we	perceive	the	mental	phenomena	that	exist	within	
us?	This	question	must	be	answered	with	an	emphatic,	
“yes,”	 for	 where	 would	 we	 have	 got	 the	 concepts	 of	
presentation	 and	 thought	 without	 such	 perception?	
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	obvious	that	we	are	not	able	to	
observe	 our	 present	mental	 phenomena.	 But	 how	 can	
we	explain	this,	if	not	by	the	fact	that	we	are	incapable	
of	 perceiving	 them?	 Previously,	 in	 fact,	 no	 other	
explanation	 seemed	 possible,	 but	 now we see the true 
reason clearly. The presentation which accompanies a mental 
act and refers to it is part of the object on which it is directed.	
(1874,	181	[99].	My	emphasis.)
I	will	not	rehearse	the	argument	to	which	Brentano	appeals,	but	simply	
assess	whether	one	can	derive	from	its	conclusion	the	A ≠ O Thesis.	He	
continues	as	follows:
If	 an	 inner presentation	 were	 ever	 to	 become	 inner	
observation,	 this	 observation	 would	 be	 directed	 upon	
itself.	Even	the	defenders	of	inner	observation,	however,	
seem	to	consider	this	impossible.	[…]	
One	 observation	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 being	
directed	 upon	 another	 observation,	 but	 not	 upon	 itself.	
The	truth	is	that	something	which is only the secondary object 
of an act	can	undoubtedly	be	an	object	of	consciousness	
in	 this	act,	but	cannot	be	an	object	of	observation	 in	 it.	
Observation	requires	that	one	turns	to	the	object	as	the	
primary	one.	Hence,	a	mental	act	obtaining	 in	us	could	
only	 be	 observed	 in	 a	 second,	 simultaneous	 act	 which	
turns	 to	 it	 as	 its	 primary	 object.	 But	 the	 accompanying	
inner	 idea	 does	 in	 fact	 not	 belong	 to	 a	 second	mental	
act.	 [Aber die begleitende Vorstellung gehört eben nicht zu 
einem zweiten Akte.]	 Thus	 we	 see	 that	 no	 simultaneous	
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Thesis. In	the	next	sections,	I	will	argue	that	such	a	reason	can	be	found	
if	we	revise	simplifying	assumptions	about	the	secondary	object.
6. A closer look at the secondary object of consciousness
In	 order	 to	 bring	 out	 the	 reason	 why	 awareness	 cannot	 become	
observation,	 we	 need	 first	 to	 highlight	 an	 important	 feature	 of	
Brentano’s	 view	 of	 awareness	 that	 is	 overlooked	 in	 the	 literature.	
He	 himself	 frequently	 talks	 as	 if	 descriptive	 psychology	 starts	 with	
individual	mental	acts	such	that	each	of	them	has	one	primary	object	
and	 is	 directed	 on	 itself	 as	 its	 secondary	 object.	However,	 this	 is	 a	
simplification.	Brentano	drops	it	at	the	beginning	of	his	discussion	of	
the	unity	of	consciousness:
In	reality,	such	a	simple	state	never	occurs.	It	frequently	
happens,	instead,	that	we	have	a	rather	large	number	of	
objects	before	our	minds	simultaneously,	with	which	we	
enter	into	many	diverse	relations	of	consciousness.	(1874,	
221	[120])
If	 we	 drop	 the	 simplifying	 assumption,	 we	 need	 to	 revisit	 our	
understanding	of	what	a	primary	and	secondary	object	are.	There	is	no	
single	act,	say,	hearing	a	tone,	that	has	the	tone	as	its	primary	and	itself	
as	its	secondary	object.	At	any	given	time,	there	are	many	mental	acts	
that	are	directed	on	several	different	primary	objects.	But	it	would	be	
wrong	to	assume	that	at	any	given	time	there	are	also	several	different	
secondary	objects,	namely	one	 for	each	of	 the	simultaneous	mental	
acts.	There is only one secondary object!
Why?	Consider	an	example.	When	I	simultaneously	see	a	colour,	
taste	 chocolate	 and	 hear	 a	 melody,	 I	 am	 co-conscious	 of	 seeing	 a	
colour,	 tasting	 chocolate	 and	 hearing	 a	 melody.	 These	 activities	
are	 objects	 of	 one	 and	 the	 same	 awareness	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	
compared	in	consciousness.	(See	Brentano	1874,	227	[123].)	Brentano	
conceptualizes	this	by	holding	that	at	any	given	time	there	is	only	one	
(OB4)	Consciousness	of	M
1
	is	not	distinct	from	M
1
.
Therefore:	Consciousness	of	M
1
	is	not	observing	M
1
.
Therefore:	It	is	not	possible	that	the	primary	object	of	M
1
 
=	M
1
.
The	conclusion	of	this	argument	is	that	if	a	mental	act	is	an	observation	
of	 something	 distinct	 from	 itself,	 it	 cannot	 also	 observe	 itself	 and	
therefore	be	its	own	primary	object.	For	instance,	listening	to	a	tone	
cannot	also	be	an	observation	of	itself.
Brentano’s	 Argument	 from	 the	 Nature	 of	 Observation	 can	 be	
attacked	on	two	points.	
First,	(OB2)	needs	further	support.	Why,	for	example,	can	a	mental	
act	 only	 have	 one	 primary	 object?	Mill	 (1865,	 64)	 pointed	 out	 that	
one	can	divide	one’s	attention:	one	can	attend	to	some	things	at	the	
same	 time.	 In	 the	 previous	 section,	 Stumpf	 appealed	 to	 the	 same	
idea.	 If	 one	 can	divide	one’s	 attention,	why	 should	one	not	be	able	
to	simultaneously	attend	to	one’s	perceiving	and	its	object?	Brentano	
needs	a	reason	to	rule	out	that	a	mental	act	can	have	several	primary	
objects,	 among	 them	 itself.	However,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	what	 this	
reason	 might	 be.	 Prima facie,	 we	 can	 divide	 our	 attention	 between	
different	activities.
Second,	 Brentano	 assumes	 that	 observing	 has	 a	 primary	 object	
distinct	from	itself.	Under	this	assumption	his	conclusion	follows.	But	
our	question	 is	whether	 this	 assumption	 is	 justified.	 If	 one	drops	 it,	
one	will	have	to	add	as	a	further	premise	to	the	argument	that	if	an	
act	M	is	an	observation	of	x, x	is	distinct	from	M.	But	this	is	the	very	
conclusion	Brentano	tries	to	establish.19
To	 sum	 up:	 This	 and	 the	 previous	 section	 suggest	 that	 the	 first	
potential	reason	for	the	A ≠ O Thesis	gets	Brentano	some,	but	not	all,	
of	the	way.	We	need	therefore	to	find	a	different	reason	for	the	A ≠ O 
19.	 Thanks	to	a	referee	for	helping	me	to	improve	the	presentation	of	this	point.
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on	the	side	[…].	(Introduction	1924,	85.	My	translation	
and	emphasis.)
The	 secondary	 object	 is	 a	 whole	 comprising	 all	 simultaneous	
mental	acts.	But	might	one	not	also	say	that	there	is	only	one	primary	
object?	When	 you	 simultaneously	 see	 a	 colour,	 hear	 a	melody	 and	
taste	chocolate,	there	are	not	three	independent	mental	acts	that	need	
to	be	combined.	You	are	aware	of	these	qualities	together	in	one	multi-
modal	experience.	(See	Tye	2007,	292.)
But	even	if	there	is	at	any	time	only	one	primary	object	in	which	
one	can	distinguish	further	objects	of	perception,	there	is	an	important	
difference	 between	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	 object.	 For	 only	 the	
parts	of	the	secondary	object	appear	to	us	as	a	unity:
We	emphasized	as	a	distinguishing	characteristic	[of	the	
mental]	 the	 fact	 that	 the	mental	 phenomena	which	we	
perceive,	 in	 spite	of	 all	 their	multiplicity,	always	 appear	
to	 us	 as	 a	 unity,	 while	 physical	 phenomena,	 which	we	
perceive	at	the	same	time,	do	not	all	appear	in	the	same	
way	as	parts	of	one	single	phenomenon.	(Brentano	1874,	
137	[75])
Our	awareness	reveals	to	us	a	whole	that	consists	of	parts,	but	these	
parts	are	not	distinguished	in	our	awareness	of	the	whole.	Brentano	
often	uses	a	chord	as	a	model	of	such	a	whole.	(See	Brentano	1912/3,	
154	[117].)	Imagine	you	hear	the	Tristan	chord.	The	chord	is	made	up	
of	the	notes	F, B, D#	and	G#.	If	you	are	not	musically	trained,	you	will	
hear	F, B, D# and G# together.	You	hear	these notes	together,	but	you	don’t	
hear	each	of	them,	in	the	sense	that	neither	F	nor	B	etc.	stand	out	in	
the	phenomenology	of	your	hearing.	The	notes	don’t	appear	 to	you	
distinctly	when	you	hear	the	chord.	Brentano	describes	this	by	saying	
that	the	tones	are	fused	to	one	unity.21
21.	 Tye	(2009,	261)	argues	for	the	same	reason	that	one	can	see	the	speckles	of	a	
hen	collectively	without	seeing	each	speckle	the	hen	has.
secondary	object	that	comprises	all	mental	acts	at	that	time.	He	makes	
this	clear	in	the	appendix	to	the	1911	edition	of	Psychologie:20
[In	a	single	mental	activity	[…]	there	is	always	a	plurality	
of	 references	 and	 a	 plurality	 of	 objects.]	 [A]s	 I	 have	
already	 emphasized	 in	 my	 Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint,	however,	one should not single out one of these 
relations to be the secondary object, for example, the mental 
relation to the primary object.	This,	as	it	can	easily	be	seen,	
will	lead	to	infinite	regress,	for	there	would	have	to	be	a	
third	reference,	which	would	have	to	have	the	secondary	
reference	 as	 object;	 a	 fourth,	 which	 would	 have	 the	
additional	 third	one	as	object;	and	so	on.	The secondary 
object is not one of the mental references, but the mental 
activity, or more precisely, the mentally active thing, in which 
the secondary reference is included along with the primary one. 
(1911,	138–9	[215].	My	translation	and	emphasis.	See	also	
Brentano	1906a,	337.)
The	main	point	is	that	the	secondary	object	of	consciousness	comprises	
all	mental	acts	that	are	co-conscious.	Brentano’s	student	and	editor	of	
Psychologie	Kraus	sums	this	up	in	his	introduction	to	Psychologie:
By	 “inner	 perception”	 Brentano	 understands	 a	
“secondary	consciousness”	that	is	inseparable	from	and	
directed	upon	our	 total “primary	consciousness”	and	at	
the	same	time	on	itself.	It	is	in	essence	independent	of	
the	will	and	accompanies	every	primary	consciousness	
20.	In	the	1874	edition	of	Psychologie,	Brentano	denied	that	there	is	a	subject	of	
experience,	a	soul.	At	the	time	of	the	second	edition	he	had	changed	his	view.	
There	is	a	soul	whose	accidents	are	thinking,	perceiving,	willing	etc.	In	the	
quote,	Brentano	shifts	to	the	new	view	when	he	reformulates	his	statement	
about	 the	secondary	object.	For,	according	 to	his	new	view,	 the	secondary	
object	is	a	mental	substance	with	all	its	accidents.	In	this	paper	I	will	not	try	
to	adjudicate	the	question	whether	the	secondary	object	is	a	substance	with	
its	accidents	or	a	whole	of	mental	acts.
	 mark	textor Brentano on Awareness and Observation
philosophers’	imprint	 –		12		– vol.	15,	no.	10	(march	2015)
abundance,	formed	of	their	mutual	interpenetration,	but	
within	which	they	occupy	no	positions.	(James	1879,	67)22
If	simultaneously	perceived	objects	don’t	have	positions	in	space	or	an	
analogous	system	of	relations,	they	are	perceived	together without being 
distinguished in perception.	The	objects	of	our	awareness	don’t	occupy	
spatial	positions	or	positions	analogous	 to	 spatial	positions.	We	are	
therefore	aware	of	co-conscious	acts	as	one	unarticulated	unity.	
This	 sets	 the	 task	 for	 descriptive	 psychology.	 Just	 as	 anatomy	
distinguishes	 in	 a	 body	 parts,	 descriptive	 psychology	 distinguishes	
in	the	unarticulated	unity	of	consciousness	parts	and	identifies	their	
relations.	Descriptive	psychology	is,	in	Brentano’s	(1890/1,	128	[135])	
words,	the	anatomy of the soul.	
How	is	the	task	of	descriptive	psychology	accomplished?	If	we	are	
initially	only	aware	of	a	unity	without	being	aware	of	any	of	its	parts,	
how	do	we	come	to	distinguish	parts	in	it?	James	takes	this	to	be	the 
foundational	question	of	psychology:	
How	can	we	ever	evolve	parts	from	a	confused	unity,	 if	
the	latter	did	not	yield	them	at	first?	How,	in	other	words,	
does	a	vague	muchness	ever	become	a	 sum	of	discrete	
constituents?	This	is	the	problem	of	Discrimination,	and	
he	who	will	 thoroughly	have	answered	it	will	have	 laid	
the	keel	for	psychology.	(James	1879,	79)
7. Laying the keel for psychology, or: How to notice 
How	do	we	discriminate	between	non-spatial	objects	of	which	we	are	
jointly	aware?	By	varying	 the	objects	of	which	we	are	 jointly	aware,	
answers	James	(1878,	253).	James	quotes	Martineau’s	helpful	example	
to	convey	the	basic	idea:
22.	While	James	is	on	the	right	track,	he	is	not	completely	right.	One	will	hear	the	
sound	of	the	brook	as	coming	from	a	location.
Why	 are	we	 aware	 of	 a	 unity	 and	 not	 an	 articulated	whole?	We	
can	 answer	 this	 question	 by	 comparing	 the	 objects	 of	 awareness	
with	 those	 of	 outer	 perception.	 The	 latter	 may	 be	 given	 to	 you	
simultaneously	as	parts	of	a	whole,	but,	as	Brentano	claims,	they	don’t	
“appear	 in	 the	 same	way	as	parts	of	 a	 single	phenomenon”.	 Imagine	
that	you	simultaneously	see	and	hear	a	trio	playing.	In	your	perception	
the	 musicians	 and	 sounds	 appear	 as	 parts	 of	 one	 whole,	 but	 you	
simultaneously	see	each	of	the	three	musicians	and	hear	the	music	as	
coming	from	them.	You	see	and	hear	the	musicians	in	virtue	of	seeing	
and	hearing	each	of	them.	Why?	Because	each	musician	appears	to	be	
located	in	a	different	position	in	the	scene	you	see.	
In	 contrast,	 in	 consciousness	 there	 is	 no	 spatial	 order	 such	 that	
each	of	several	co-conscious	objects	appears	to	us	distinctly.	Brentano	
makes	 this	point	 in	 telegraphic	 style	when	he	 comments	 about	our	
consciousness	as	follows:
No	juxtaposition.	[Kein	nebeneinander]
No	manifold	of	objects	[…].	(Brentano	1890/1,	11[13])
William	 James	 is	 less	 telegraphic	 and	provides	 a	helpful	 illustration	
when	arguing	against	the	idea	that	space	is	the	order	of	simultaneously	
existing	things.	There	are	things	—	the	elements	of	consciousness	—	
that	exist	simultaneously.	Yet,	James	observes,	they	are	not	arranged	
in	 space.	Consider	 for	 illustration	 his	 example.	He	 pictures	 himself	
writing	near	a	babbling	brook:	
The	sound	of	 the	brook	near	which	 I	write,	 the	odor	of	
the	 cedars,	 the	 feeling	 of	 satisfaction	 with	 which	 my	
breakfast	 has	 filled	me,	 and	my	 interest	 in	writing	 this	
article,	 all	 simultaneously	 co-exist	 in	my	 consciousness	
without	falling	into	any	sort	of	spatial	order.	If,	with	my	
eyes	shut,	these	elements	of	consciousness	give	me	any	
spatial	feeling	at	all,	it	is	that	of	a	teeming	muchness	or	
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Awareness	is	a	kind	of	perceiving,	and	perceiving	is	for	Brentano	
a	kind	of	acknowledgement.	Brentano’s	notion	of	acknowledgement	
deserves	more	attention	than	I	can	give	it	here.24	But	for	our	purposes	
it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 a	 non-propositional	 attitude:	 one	
acknowledges	an	object	if,	and	only	if,	one	thinks	of	it	in	a	way	that	
commits	 one	 to	 its	 existence	 without	 predicating	 the	 property	 of	
existence	of	it.
Awareness	consists	in	acknowledgement	of	a	whole	that	is	composed	
of	 all	 simultaneous	mental	 acts	 of	 a	 thinker.	We	 acknowledge	 this	
whole	without	 acknowledging	 each	 part.	 Consider	 hearing	 a	 chord	
for	 illustration.	 I	can	hear	 the	notes	of	 the	chord	together,	but	none	
of	 them	 “stands	 out”	 in	my	 auditory	 experience.	With	 this	 in	mind	
we	 can	 explain	 Brentano’s	 distinction	 between	 explicit perception,	 or	
noticing,	and	implicit perception.	If	one	acknowledges	the	whole	{A, B}, 
one	 thereby	perceives	A	 implicitly	and	B	 implicitly:	one	hears	 them	
together,	without	hearing	A	and	hearing	B.	In	Brentano’s	own	words:	
A	clarification	of	this	distinction	[explicit	versus	implicit	
perception]	 seems	 to	 be	 desirable.	 Perception	 is	 an	
acknowledgement.	And	if	the	accepted	thing	is	a	whole	
with	 parts,	 then	 the	 parts	 are	 all,	 in	 a	 certain	 manner,	
co-accepted	 [mitanerkannt].	 The	 denial	 of	 any	 of	 them	
would	 contradict	 the	 whole.	 Yet	 the	 individual	 part	 is,	
for	 this	 reason,	by	no	means	accepted	 let	 alone	 judged	
specifically	[nicht ausdrücklich]	(by	itself)	and	in	particular.	
(1890/1,	34	[36])
However,	if	one	acknowledges	the	whole	{A, B} and	one	acknowledges	
A	and	acknowledges B,	one	notices A	and	one	notices B	in	{A,	B}	or	one	
apperceives	them	(and	vice versa).25
How	 do	 we	 come	 to	 acknowledge	 A	 when	 we	 acknowledge	 a	
whole	that	contains	it	as	part?	Brentano’s	answer	is	similar	to	James’s.	
24.	 For	further	discussion	see	Textor	2007.
25.	 See	Brentano	1890/1,	Appendix	VI,	162	[171].
When	a	 red	 ivory	ball,	 seen	 for	 the	first	 time,	has	been	
withdrawn,	 it	 will	 leave	 a	 mental	 representation	 of	
itself,	 in	 which	 all	 that	 it	 simultaneously	 gave	 us	 will	
indistinguishably	co-exist.	Let	a	white	ball	succeed	to	it;	
now,	and	not	before,	will	an	attribute	detach	 itself,	and	
the	 color,	 by	 force	 of	 contract,	 be	 shaken	 out	 into	 the	
foreground.	(Martineau	1860,	271)
One	cannot	 see	a	 colour	 in	 the	 sense	of	 a	particular	 colour	 trope	 if	
one	does	not	see	the	spatial	extension	it	fills.	And	one	cannot	see	a	
particular	 spatial	 extension	 without	 a	 colour	 filling	 it.	 Both	 colour	
and	 spatial	 extension	 are	 jointly	 given	 in	 one’s	 perception;	 neither	
of	 them	stands	out.	However,	 if	 the	 joint	perception	of	 redness	and	
spatial	extension	 is	 followed	by	a	 joint	perception	of	whiteness	and	
spatial	 extension,	whiteness	 and	 redness	 both	will	 be	 “shaken	 into	
the	 foreground”;	 the	 contrast	between	 them	makes	both	noticeable.	
Similar	examples	can	be	given	for	other	sense	modalities.	Martineau’s	
examples	makes	plausible	 that	when	we	perceive	 several	 objects	A, 
B	 and	C	 jointly,	A	will	 stand	out	 and	be	 an	object	of	 attention	 if	 in	
a	 further	perception	we	perceive	A, B	 and	D	 jointly	where	C	 and	D 
are	incompatible.	Hence,	by	varying	some	co-perceived	elements	and	
replacing	them	with	incompatible	elements,	they	become	noticeable	
and	one	can	perceive	them	in	particular.	James	(1878,	253)	calls	this	the	
law of dissociation by varying concomitants.	It	applies	to	our	awareness	of	
our	mental	life	
In	 his	 lectures	 on	 descriptive	 psychology,	 Brentano	works	 out	 a	
version	of	the	variation	answer.23	Let’s	work	through	the	basic	tenets	
of	Brentano’s	proposal. 
23.	 James	quotes	Spencer’s	Principles of Psychology	(1855,	§	157)	and	Martineau’s	
review	of	Bain	(Martineau	1860,	271f)	as	inspirations	for	the	solution	of	the	
discrimination	problem.	Brentano	also	read	Spencer’s	Principles of Psychology.	
He	refers	to	them,	and	to	Ribot’s	(1870)	overview	that	contains	a	section	on	
Spencer,	 in	Psychologie.	 I	 assume	 that	 Spencer’s	Principles	 are	 the	 common	
source	of	James’s	and	Brentano’s	proposals.
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question	 arises	 for	 James.	 For	 his	 talk	 of	 variation	 is	 metaphorical.	
What	does	“variation”	of	elements	of	consciousness	amount	to?
Brentano’s	 examples	 suggest	 an	 answer.	 When	 the	 descriptive	
psychologist	 wants	 to	 notice	 her	 evident	 judging,	 she	 creates	
differences	 by	 either	 imagining	 or	 remembering	 cases	 of	 blind	
judgement.	Brentano’s	 student	Stumpf	works	out	 this	 suggestion	by	
exploring	the	analogy	between	anatomy	and	descriptive	psychology.	
The	anatomist	can	simultaneously	see	a	whole	body	as	well	as	some	of	
its	parts.	He	notices	these	parts	when	he	perceives	the	body.	Similarly,	
the	musically	trained	hearer	can	hear	the	orchestra	and	distinguish	the	
sounds	of	the	instruments.	What	explains	the	ability	to	simultaneously	
perceive	a	whole	and	distinguishing	some	parts	in	it?
The	anatomist	need	not	see	the	figures	of	reality	sharper	
than	the	layman;	the	latter	may	even	have	better	sight.	But	
for	the	former	phantasy	immediately	subjoins	[suppliert]	
the	individual	parts,	and	thereby	a	difference	between	the	
picture	and	what	one	thinks-in	[hineindenkt]	 it	becomes	
easily	noticeable.	(Stumpf	1873,	131.	My	translation.)
The	anatomist	can	easily	episodically	remember	and/or	imagine	other	
bodies	that	contrast	with	the	body	he	sees.	This	allows	him	to	see	the	
body	and	to	notice	parts	in	it	that	are	unusual.27 
Stumpf	replaces	the	metaphorical	talk	of	variation	of	concomitant	
elements	with	a	description	of	 the	abilities	—	episodic	memory	and	
visual	or	auditory	 imagination	—	that	are	exercised	 in	noticing.	The	
descriptive	psychologist	 intentionally	 creates	differences	 in	order	 to	
notice	by	imagining	or	episodically	recalling	contrast	cases.
8. Why awareness can’t become observation
We	are	now	in	a	position	to	answer	our	question:	Why can’t awareness 
become inner observation?	We	can	be	aware	of	our	mental	life	without	
27.	 The	parts	are	not	created,	as	Stumpf	originally	assumed,	by	comparing	and	
contrasting,	but	we	come	to	notice	parts	that	are	already	there.	See	Stumpf	
1907,	18.
We	are	in	a	position	to	notice	elements	of	a	unified	whole	when	there	
is	a	partial	change	in	our	mental	life	that	creates	a	contrast.	When	we	
perceive	first	A	and	B	together,	then	B	and	C together,	where	C	and	A 
are	incompatible,	this	contrast	makes	A	(C)	stand	out.	A	(C)	becomes	
noticeable,	 and	we	 can	 come	 to	 acknowledge	A	 (C)	 as	 well	 as	 the	
whole	it	is	part	of.26 
Such	 contrasts	may	 simply	 come	 about	 in	 our	mental	 life	when	
one	 unified	 whole	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 different	 one.	 The	 descriptive	
psychologist	whose	 project	 is	 to	 notice	 the	 parts	 of	 her	mental	 life	
needs	to	intentionally	seek	out	and	create	such	contrasts.	Comparing	
and	 contrasting	 is	 the	 “most	 essential	 vehicle	 of	 scientific	 progress”	
when	it	comes	to	psychology	(Brentano	1890/1,	55	[58]).	Brentano	uses	
examples	to	illustrate	the	procedure	of	descriptive	psychology.	Evident	
judgements,	such	as	the	judgement	that	everything	is	self-identical	or	
the	judgement	that	I	think	etc.,	can	be	partially	characterized	by	saying	
that	they	cannot	be	false.	How	does	one	complete	one’s	understanding	
of	what	an	evident	judgement	is?	One	needs	to	consider	paradigmatic	
instances	of	evident	judgements	and	compare	and	contrast	them	with	
blind	judgements,	such	as	the	judgement	that	I	was	in	Rome	a	while	
ago.	(See	Brentano	1890/1,	52	[54].)	In	this	way	one	comes	to	know	the	
difference	between	blind	and	evident	 judgements,	 and	 thereby	one	
comes	to	know	the	distinctive	features	of	evident	judgements.	He	goes	
on	to	comment:
The	 examples	which	 I	 have	 given	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	
the	method	of	 comparison,	 the	distinctive	arrangement	
of	differences,	through which the implicitly perceived becomes 
explicitly noticeable,	can	of	course	be	multiplied	to	infinity.	
(1890/1,	54	[56].	My	translation	and	emphasis.)
The	descriptive	psychologist	uses	the method of comparison,	that	is,	she	
“artificially	intentionally	compose	differences”	(ibid.)	between	mental	
phenomena.	How	does	the	descriptive	psychologist	do	this?	A	similar	
26.	See	Brentano	1890/1,	55	[57].
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is	perceived	together	with	other	objects.29	When	we	see	him	among	
other	things,	we	see	also	how	he	can	be	seen	better.	(See	Kelly	2010,	
150.)	For	example,	when	I	see,	say,	 the	front	of	an	object,	 the	way	it	
looks	to	me	is	a	presentation	of	the	front	as	well	as	a	perceptual	proxy	
of	further	unseen	parts	of	the	object.	(See	Husserl	1904,	36–7.)	If	I	see	
the	house	in	seeing	its	forefront,	I	am	aware	that	further	views	of	it	are	
available.	I	feel	that	my	actual	seeing	is	inadequate	and	that	my	view	
of	the	house	can	be	improved.	The	appearance	of	the	visible	part	of	
the	house	suggests	to	us	how	the	hidden	parts	may	look	and	how	we	
can	come	to	perceive	them:	we	have	expectations	of	how	the	object	
will	look	to	us	if	we	change	our	position	with	respect	to	it.	However,	
such	an	“expectation”	is	not	a	belief	that	an	event	will	occur.	Husserl	
(1904,	 109)	 talks	 about	 emotional	 expectation	 (Gemütserwartung).	
Sometimes	 you	 feel	 that	 something	 is	 about	 to	 happen.	 Hence,	 in	
seeing	 an	 object,	we	 know	how	 to	 improve	 our	 view	on	 it.	 Similar	
things	hold	for	listening,	touching	etc.	
When	we	turn	our	attention	to	an	object	of	outer	perception,	we	
desire	to	perceive	it	better.	Our	perception	of	the	object	gives	us	clues	
as	to	how	this	desire	can	be	satisfied.	If	one	perceives	the	object	out	of	
this	desire	—	that	is,	if	one	observes	the	object	—	one	still	perceives	it;	
the	kind	of	activity	does	not	change.	What	changes	is	one’s	motive	for	
persisting	with	the	activity	and	the	conditions	under	which	it	persists.
To	 sum	 up:	 Objects	 of	 outer	 perception	 can,	 while	 elements	 of	
consciousness	 can’t,	 be	 noticed	 without	 seeking	 out	 contrast	 cases.	
Hence,	 awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation.	 Observing	 one’s	
mental	life	always	requires	activities	that	are	different	from	awareness.	
Awareness	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 perceiving,	 but	 this	 intrinsic	 awareness	 is	
29.	Kelly	 (2010,	 153	 and	 149)	 argues	 that	perceiving	 an	object	 involves	 “being	
driven	to	get	a	better	grip	on	it”.	However,	one	can	perceive	an	object	without	
being	driven	to	perceive	it	better.	Consider	an	example:	I	see	the	group	of	
people	standing	around	the	Mona Lisa	as	well	as	the	painting.	When	I	turn	my	
attention	to	the	Mona Lisa,	I	am	motivated	to	bring	about	that	(some	of)	my	
perceptual	anticipations	of	the	painting	are	fulfilled.	Yet	I	still	see	the	people,	
and	 I	am	aware	 that	 further	perceptions	of	 them	are	available	 to	me,	but	 I	
am	not	motivated	to	bring	these	about.	The	people	are	therefore	part	of	the	
background	of	my	perception;	the	painting	is	in	the	foreground.
noticing	its	elements.	In	order	to	observe	something,	we	need	to	notice	
it.	In	the	case	of	elements	of	the	unity	of	consciousness,	we	can	notice	
them	only	if	we	seek	out	contrast	cases	by	episodically	remembering	
or	imagining	them.	These	activities	are	different	from	our	awareness	
of	 our	 current	mental	 life.	We	 need	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 our	mental	 life	
and,	in	addition,	to	episodically	remember	or	imagine	contrast	cases	
to	notice	parts,	individual	activities,	in	it.	Awareness	cannot	become	
noticing,	 since	one	can’t	 satisfy	 the	desire	 to	notice	 the	elements	of	
one’s	mental	 life	only by continuing to be aware of them under improved 
conditions.	 Further	 activities	 in	 addition	 to	 awareness	 are	 required.	
For	example,	while	 it	 is	 intrinsic	 to	simultaneous	activities	 that	 they	
are	co-conscious,	it	is	not	intrinsic	to	them	that	they	are	contrasted	in	
imagination	with	incompatible	activities.	The	feature	that	awareness	
cannot	become	observation	is	grounded	in	the	fact	that	the	secondary	
object	of	our	perceiving	is	a	unified	whole	comprising	all	simultaneous	
perceptual	activities.28
Compare	outer	perceiving.	We	have	already	seen	that	the	objects	
of	outer	perceptions	—	for	instance,	of	visual	perception	—	need	not	
form	one	unified	whole.	When	I	see	the	trio	play,	I	see	each	musician	
and	can,	if	I	so	desire,	notice	each	of	them.	In	order	to	notice,	say,	the	
drummer,	 I	 don’t	 need	 to	 seek	 out	 contrast	 cases.	 Observing	 him	
(watching	him)	is	seeing	him	out	of	interest	to	learn	about	him.	The	
change	 from	 seeing	 to	watching	 concerns	 the	desire	 that	motivates	
my	seeing.	When	one	watches	the	drummer,	one	still	sees	him;	seeing	
and	watching	are the same perceptual activity.	
Watching	 the	 drummer	 does	 not	 require	 seeking	 out	 contrast	
cases.	Why?	 The	 drummer	 stands	 out	 in	 our	 perception	 even	 if	 he	
28.	There	 are	 some	non-mental	 objects	 that	 are	 also	 only	 observable	 by	 com-
paring	and	contrasting	 them	with	other	objects.	Chords	or	 complex	 tastes	
provide	a	model	for	the	unified	whole	that	is	given	to	us	in	consciousness,	be-
cause	they	are	complexes	of	non-spatial	parts.	The	parts	of	these	objects	are	
not	differentiated	in	the	phenomenology	of	our	perception	of	them.	We	need	
to	recall	contrasting	notes	to	distinguish	the	parts	of	a	chord	when	we	hear	
it.	However,	a	tone	can	be	perceived	in	isolation.	In	contrast,	the	elements	of	
consciousness	are	given	to	us	only	as	parts	of	unified	wholes.
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perceiving	and	 its	objects	but	 in	a	position	 to	notice	only	 the	 latter.	
From	 Brentano’s	 perspective	 the	 objection	 that	 there	 is	 perceiving	
without	awareness	of	perceiving	is	based	on	a	faulty	assumption	about	
the	object	of	our	awareness.	We	are	aware	of	one	unified	whole	that	
contains	all	simultaneous	mental	acts,	but	not	all	parts	of	the	whole	
are	differentiated	in	our	awareness.	Those	that	are	fused	with	others,	
among	them	our	current	mental	activities,	are	not	noticed	and	become	
noticeable	only	when	contrast	cases	are	created.
Brentano	has,	 then,	 a	 good	 reason	 to	 say	 that	 awareness	 cannot	
become	 observation.	 His	 reason	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 view	 that	
the	descriptive	psychologist	can	develop	an	anatomy	of	 the	soul.	 In	
fact,	 considerations	 about	 the	 method	 of	 descriptive	 psychology	
help	to	show	why	awareness	cannot	be	observation.	Observation	of	
one’s	mental	 life	 requires	 the	 exercise	 of	memory	 and	 imagination	
in	seeking	out	contrast	cases.	One	can	observe	one’s	mental	life,	but	
one’s	observing	is	based	on,	but	does	not	consist	in,	awareness.	
9. Observation and time-consciousness
The	result	of	the	previous	section	is	that	observing	one’s	current	mental	
life	 cannot	 only	 consist	 in	 awareness.	 In	 later	 work	 Brentano	 goes	
one	 step	 further:	 observing	one’s	mental	 life	does	not	 even	 involve	
awareness,	although	it	presupposes	it.	
Brentano’s	argument	 is	based	on	his	view	of	 time-consciousness.	
This	view	raises	several	questions,	but	for	our	purposes	an	outline	will	
suffice.30	Consider	 the	example	of	hearing	a	melody.	When	I	hear	a	
melody,	I	hear	a	succession	of	tones:	F	is	played	first,	then	D,	then	G….	
Hearing	such	a	succession	as a succession	requires	that	I	continue	to	be	
auditorily	aware	of	F although	F	is	no	longer	played	when	I	hear	D.	For	
Brentano,	every	mental	act	has	itself	as	a	secondary	object.	Hence,	the	
question	arises:	Does	one	also	retain	one’s	awareness	of	hearing	F	(the	
secondary	object	of	one’s	hearing	F)	at	the	time	when	one	hears	D?	No,	
answers	Brentano:
30.	See	Mulligan	2005,	78ff.
an	awareness	of	a	whole	comprising	all	simultaneous	perceptions.	It	
takes	effort	and	further	activities	to	observe	one	of	these	perceptions	
in	particular.	Awareness	alone	is	insufficient.
Brentano’s	 observation	 about	 the	 secondary	 object	 also	 explains	
why	 the	 secondary	 object,	 one’s	 total	 perceptual	 activity,	 goes	
unnoticed	when	one	perceives	something.	If	we	go	back	to	the	list	of	
objects	 in	James’s	example	(sect.	7),	we	see	that	 it	contains	physical	
objects	 like	 sounds	and	mental	phenomena	 like	 interests.	We	don’t	
perceive	a	sound	and	a	colour	together	and	are	conscious	of	hearing	
and	 seeing.	We	 are	 jointly	 aware	 of	 a	 sound,	 a	 colour,	 our	 hearing	
and	 our	 seeing.	 In	 Brentano’s	words:	 “In	 one	 and	 the	 same	mental	
phenomenon	in	which	the	tone	is	presented	we	apprehend	the	mental	
phenomenon	 […]”	 (Brentano	 1874,	 179	 [98]).	 This	 is	why	Brentano	
speaks	of	“the	peculiar	fusion	of	the	accompanying	presentation	with	
its	object”	(Brentano	1874,	183	[100]).	He	formulates	the	same	point	
also	in	mereological	terms:
[O]riginally	 the	 totality	 of	 our	 consciousness	 may	
have	 been	 a	 confused	 unity	 in	which	 no	 single	 part	 is	
distinguished	from	another	one	and not even the physical 
and the mental that appears to us was distinguished.	 Later	
this	 is	 never	 completely	 the	 case;	 but	 depending	 on	
where	 attention	 is	 turned	 in	 particular,	 large	 areas	 of	
consciousness	from	which	it	turns	away	remain	without	
any	particular	presentation	of	individual	parts	contained	
in	consciousness.	(Brentano	1906a,	334.	My	translation.)
The	physical	objects	that	are	parts	of	the	totality	of	which	we	are	
aware	can	be	noticed	if	we	are	interested	in	perceiving	them,	because	
they	appear	 to	us	spatially	 located.	 In	contrast,	 the	mental	activities	
that	 are	parts	of	 this	 totality	don’t	 stand	out,	because	 they	 lack	 this	
feature.	 They	 are	 fused	with	 all	 other	 objects	 we	 are	 jointly	 aware	
of,	and	we	cannot	notice	them,	even	if	we	so	desire,	simply	by	being	
aware	 of	 them.	 Hence,	 when	 we	 perceive,	 we	 are	 co-aware	 of	 our	
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more	about	our	hearing	of	the	tone,	we	cannot	do	so	by	maintaining	
awareness	of	it:	we	cannot	observe	it.	We	have	to	remember	hearing	
the	tone.	In	these	memories,	hearing	is	no	longer	the	secondary	but	
the	primary	object.	Whenever	we	observe	a	mental	phenomenon,	only 
memory	and	imagination	can	be	involved:
We	really	can	accomplish	to	turn	our	attention	to	a	past	
mental	 phenomenon	 just	 as	 we	 can	 turn	 to	 a	 present	
physical	 phenomenon,	 and	 in	 this	 way	 we	 can,	 so	 to	
speak,	observe	it.	(1874,	49	[26].	In	part	my	translation.)
Now	 this	 argument	 rests	 on	 the	 controversial	 view	 that	 one	 can	
be	aware	only	of	present	mental	 acts.	 I	will	not	 try	 to	argue	 for	 (or	
against)	this	view.	For	even	if	we	can	be	aware	of	our	perceiving	etc.	
over	 time,	we	can	come	 to	 learn	more	about	 it	only	by	seeking	out	
contrasts	 in	 imagination	 and	memory,	 and	 hence,	 while	 awareness	
may	 be	 involved	 in	 observing	mental	 acts,	 it	 cannot	 constitute	 this	
observation.
10. Conclusion
Brentano	 provided	 independent	 reasons	 for	 the	 conclusion	 that	
awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation.	 This	 justifies	 privileging	
the	outer	object	of	a	perception	as	its	primary	object:	it	is	the	object	
that	can	be	observed	 in	one’s	perceiving.	 It	seems	to	us	 that	we	are	
aware	only	of	the	outer	object	and	not	of	the	perceiving	itself	because	
perception	 cannot	 be	 or	 become	 observation	 of	 itself.	 At	 the	 same	
time	Brentano’s	account	of	noticing	and	observation	has	room	for	an	
“anatomy	of	 the	 soul”	 that	proceeds	by	noticing	 the	elements	of	our	
mental	life.32
32.	 This	paper	is	a	descendant	of	my	Inaugural	Lecture	in	King’s	College	in	April	
2013.	I	presented	material	related	to	this	paper	at	seminars	at	the	Georg-Au-
gustus-Universität	Göttingen	and	 the	Universidad	Alberto	Hurtado	 in	San-
tiago,	Chile,	and	in	talks	at	the	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Mind	in	Nature	and	the	
workshop	“Beyond	Brentano”	in	Salzburg	in	2014.	I	am	grateful	for	feedback	
from	Nick	Allott,	Christian	Beyer,	 Johannes	Brandl,	Leandro	De	Brasi,	Dag-
finn	Føllesdal,	Guillaume	Fréchette,	Chris	Gauker,	Bob	Hale,	 Jessica	Leech,	
In	the	studies	I	made	about	time	I	thought	I	discovered	
that	only	the	primary	object	appears	to	us	in	a	certain	tem-
poral	extension,	not	the	secondary	one,	that	it	would	lead	
to	a	monstrous	assumption	of	a	continuum	of	 infinitely	
many	dimensions	if	we	also	thought	of	the	mental	as	ex-
tended.	If I hear a melody, a succession of tones appears to me, 
not a succession of hearings.	[…]	This	gives	the	study	of	the	
act	with	respect	to	the	primary	object	special	preference.	
(Brentano	1906b,	378–9.	My	emphasis	and	translation.)
When	 you	 hear	 D,	 you	 also	 retain	 the	 previously	 heard	 note	 F	 in	
your	 perceptual	 awareness.	 Let	 us	 now	 assume	 for	 reduction	 that	
you	also	retain	awareness	of	hearing	F.	According	to	the	assumption	
under	consideration,	you	are	aware	of	hearing	D	and	having	heard	F.	
Brentano	comments:
In	 such	 an	 inner	 proteraesthesis	 an	 earlier	 perceiving	
would	have	to	appear	to	us	as	earlier,	but	as	directed	to	
something	as	if	it	were	present.	(Brentano	1914,	106	[64])
If	this	was	right,	the	retained	note	F	would	seem	to	be	in	the	past,	but	
you	were	also	aware	of	F	as	an	object	of	a	previous	hearing,	and	thereby	
you	were	aware	of	it	as	if	it	were	present.	Brentano	takes	this	to	be	an	
unpalatable	consequence	and	restricts	the	secondary	awareness	to	the	
present.	In	hearing	a	melody	over	time,	we	are	at	each	time	aware	only	
of	our	present	hearing	and	our	present	awareness.	
The	punctiform	character	of	awareness	gives	Brentano	a	reason	to	
strengthen	the	A ≠ O Thesis.31	For	beings	like	us,	observing	takes	time:	
it	is	a	process.	You	cannot,	for	example,	observe	a	punctiform	stroke	of	
lightning;	you	can	only	perceive	it.	Similarly,	one	can	maintain	contact	
with	the	tone	in	one	extended	hearing,	but	one	can’t	maintain	contact	
with	one’s	hearing	of	it	in	one	extended	episode	of	awareness,	because	
our	awareness	has	no	temporal	extension.	Even	if	we	desire	to	learn	
31.	 See	also	Kraus	1919,	38.
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